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LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Brandon L. Garrettt
The Supreme Court frequently relies on state law when
interpreting the U.S. Constitution. What is less understood is
the degree and manner in which the Supreme Court and other
federal courts look to local law. Although it has gone largely
unnoticed, there is a robust practice of acknowledging and
accounting for local law in the course of constitutional interpre-
tation. Local evidence may inform the decision whether to
recognize a constitutional right, it may inform the interpreta-
tion of the right, and it may inform the remedies for a constitu-
tional violation. For example, the Supreme Court has
examined local enforcement patterns to decide whether a con-
stitutional right is violated in death penalty jurisprudence. In
substantive due process rulings, a lack of local enforcement
has provided support for recognizing constitutional rights.
Judges seek to minimize remedies for constitutional violations
that might disrupt local law and practice. As is done with
respect to states, judges consider whether local practices are
outlying or common. Judges also look to local law and prac-
tice to inform the development of constitutional norms. This
Article analyzes and defends reliance on local law and prac-
tice in constitutional interpretation not to advocate localism or
deference to local practice, but as evidence in constitutional
interpretation. Using local evidence in constitutional law is
particularly important at a time in which empirical research on
local-level data is providing information that can better inform
constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court frequently relies on state law when
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.' The Justices may look to
state law for a range of purposes: surveying state laws to assess
a "national consensus"; 2 to minimize disruption of existing
state practices; 3 to enforce the Constitution against outlier
states; 4 to consider whether a constitutional rule raises general
federalism concerns; and asking whether an interpretation of
the Constitution comports with traditional notions of due pro-
cess or "fundamental" rights. Less understood is the degree
and manner in which the Supreme Court and other federal
courts also look to local law. In this Article, I argue that local
law and practice provides important evidence in constitutional
interpretation.
1 Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards", 57
UCLA L. REv. 365, 368-70 (2009); Note, State Law as "Other Law": Our FYfty
Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1670, 1671
(2007).
2 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2005).
3 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting that "a number of
[sitates" had laws with exceptions for the type of peyote use at issue).
4 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996).
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When should local evidence matter for constitutional pur-
poses? Counties and cities are not sovereigns in the same way
that states are. For some purposes, federal courts treat local
law as subordinate to state law. However, just as state prac-
tices can matter when assessing federal constitutional ques-
tions, so can local practices, notwithstanding local
governments' lack of independent sovereignty. For example,
courts may seek to interpret constitutional provisions in a way
that will minimize disruption of local practices, courts may
consider whether local government practices under review are
outlying or common, or courts may review local rules or prac-
tices in developing new norms. I do not argue here for a version
of localism-that the local practice deserves deference. I do
argue that local practice is undervalued in constitutional inter-
pretation-at a time in which empirical research on local-level
data is providing a wealth of information that can inform the
law.5
One area in which the courts have prominently suggested
that counting counties may be a useful exercise is in the Eighth
Amendment context. In 2015, Justice Stephen Breyer raised
the issue directly in his dissent in the case of Glossip v. Gross,
highlighting how "[gleography also plays an important role in
determining who is sentenced to death."6 Justice Breyer noted
5 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Alexander Jakubow & Ankur Desai, The
American Death Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 575-615
(2017) (analyzing twenty-five years of death sentencing data at local level and
describing relevance for constitutional doctrine). I do not argue that local prac-
tices necessarily deserve deference or that constitutional rules should necessarily
be "tailored" to accommodate local practices, but rather that local practices and
rules should matter as important evidence in constitutional interpretation. See
also infra Part III (discussing why local practices and rules are important evidence
in constitutional interpretation and what methods should be used to assess
them). For prominent arguments that local constitutional norms deserve defer-
ence, see, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 561-63 (1999) (arguing that local politi-
cal institutions are critical to substantive constitutional enforcement); Joseph
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 85 (2013) (arguing that local govern-
ments should have fewer constitutional restrictions on regulating firearms in
urban areas); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitu-
tional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1636 (2005) (arguing that local govern-
ments should be held to different constitutional standards than state or federal
authorities in some circumstances); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional
Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 153-67 (2005) (argu-
ing that local governments have different, and under some circumstances greater,
powers than state governments in protecting constitutional rights); Richard C.
Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1815 (2004) (arguing that local governments are a "robust
structural component" of the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty).
6 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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that from 2004 to 2009, "just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of
counties in the country) accounted for approximately half of all
death sentences imposed nationwide."7 Justice Breyer dis-
cussed a body of empirical research examining the changing
local geography of the death penalty and called for full briefing
on whether the death penalty is now a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment.8 Citing to empirical
studies of local factors such as the preferences of local prosecu-
tors, adequacy of local defense resources, and racial distribu-
tion within counties, Justice Breyer argued that focusing on
local government shows how "unusual" the death penalty has
become and how arbitrary its imposition is.9 Justice Breyer
repeated those concerns in a subsequent dissent from denial of
certiorari.1 0 While that type of empirical analysis has not in-
formed a majority opinion in the Supreme Court, it has in-
formed majority opinions in state courts, including a recent
unanimous decision by the Washington Supreme Court apply-
ing state constitutional law to find the death penalty unconsti-
tutional and a Connecticut Supreme Court decision."
This analysis demonstrates how local government prac-
tices can provide valuable evidence in constitutional construc-
tion. In the Eighth Amendment context, in which the focus has
been on the "evolving standards of decency" in our country, the
Supreme Court has at times insisted that the "clearest and
7 Id.
8 Id. at 2761-62.
9 Id. at 2759-61 (citing studies finding that county disparities may be due to
"the power of the local prosecutor," as well as "the availability of resources for
defense counsel" and "the racial composition of and distribution within a
county").
10 Sirect v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470, 470 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("The number of yearly executions has fallen from its peak of
98 in 1999 to 19 so far this year, while the average period of imprisonment
between death sentence and execution has risen from 12 years to over 18 years in
that same period." (citing DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Facts about the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R768-2Q58] (updated Dec. 7, 2016); TRACY L. SNELL, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPTAL PUNISHMENT, 2013-STATIsIcAL TABLEs 14 tbl.10 (Dec.
19, 2014); DEATH, PENALTY INFO CTR., Execution List 2016, https://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2016 [https://perma.cc/S74B-CUUZ])).
11 State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 630, 642 (Wash. 2018) (describing findings
of statistical study of Washington death sentences, finding significant county-by-
county variation in decisions to impose the death penalty, as well as strong race-
based variations; while the analysis did not rely on county-level disparities, it
more broadly found evidence of "arbitrary and racially biased" sentencing); State
v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 49 (Conn. 2015) (noting that Connecticut "has imposed
sustained death sentences at a rate . .. that is among the lowest in the nation,"
and citing to detailed empirical analysis of those death sentences by Professor
John Donohue).
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most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." 12 Such judi-
cial assessment of "national consensus" and "evolving stan-
dards of decency" has its critics, who argue that state law is not
instructive because capital punishment is linked to the prefer-
ences of local prosecutors, jurors, and judges. 13 In part for
that reason, scholars have assembled a large body of empirical
research examining local-level death sentencing practices. 14
In general, relying on state law when interpreting the fed-
eral Constitution may not always be the most appropriate way
to capture the question of whether a federal constitutional rule
would unduly inhibit state action. It is a far more settled prac-
tice to examine state law when interpreting constitutional
rights than to examine local law.15 However, critics have long
been concerned that nose-counting of state laws can be a
strained or artificial exercise,1 6 that doing so undervalues fed-
eral constitutional norms, or that it can overvalue state govern-
ment norms that do not fit federal constitutional values well.17
There is not just one way in which the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts rely on patterns in state law. In Atkins v.
12 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 334 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) ("'[F]lirst' among the 'objective indicia that reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction' are statutes passed by society's elected
representatives."). It is also telling that both of those rulings were later reversed
when state legislation changed. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
13 See Lain, supra note 1, at 367-68 n.7-8 (citing critics); Robert J. Smith,
Bidish J. Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (and How to
Do It Better), 35 CARDozo L. REV. 2397, 2423-28 (2014); Susan Raeker-Jordan,
Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment "Still in Search of A Unifying
PrInciple"?, 73 U. PrT. L. REV. 107, 160 (2011).
14 See Garrett, Jakubow & Desai, supra note 5, at 592-95; see also BRANDON
L. GARRET, END OF ITS ROPE: How KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 107-31 (2017) (presenting statistical analysis of death sentencing from
1990 to 2015); Lee Kovarsky, Muscle Memory and the Local Concentration of
Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE L.J. 259, 265-85 (2016) (examining county-level
concentration of death sentences).
15 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 112 (2012); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS 453 (2004); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA 4 (2006).
16 For critiques, see Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalisn The
Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1091-93, 1106 (2006). For defenses, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Counting States, 32 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POLY 17, 18-26 (2009); Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147,
1159-68 (1993); Eric A. Posner & Cass R Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59
STAN. L. REv. 131, 142-46 (2006).
17 See Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government": Federal Recourse
to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REv. 65, 89 (2006).
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Virginia, the majority emphasized: "It is not so much the num-
ber of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change."' 8 Sometimes a more forgiving minority
practice is selected because it is less disruptive as a constitu-
tional floor than the approach adopted by the majority of
states.' 9 Justice Harlan famously defended such rulings as
"born of the need to cope with national diversity under the
constraints of the incorporation doctrine."20 For that reason,
the Court at times ratifies the practice of a minority of states.
In other instances, as David Strauss describes, the Court
adopts a "modernizing" rule to strike down infrequently en-
forced and outdated law. 2 1 While sometimes taking account of
state law, in other situations Supreme Court Justices have
raised concerns as to competence of federal judges to assess
state law. "The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory
because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we are
generally unfamiliar," as the majority put it in Michigan v.
Long.2 2 Consistency is another reason why judges may fear
considering the content of state law. Deference to "the vagaries
of state criminal law," for example, can result in a "crazy quilt"
rather than "uniform 'law of the land.'" 2 3
As I will describe in Part II of this Article, there are impor-
tant examples of robust use of local evidence in constitutional
law. That evidence may be relevant to (1) define the constitu-
tional right itself, by using local information to influence con-
stitutional norms; (2) assess whether the right is violated by
using local evidence to inform the analysis; and (3) decide what
the appropriate remedy is for a constitutional violation. In ad-
dition, local evidence may be looked at in different ways. I
describe four types of use of local evidence in constitutional
law, in which courts: (1) examine patterns of local law and
practice, including in criminal procedure cases, and most
prominently in the death penalty area; (2) examine patterns of
county-level enforcement to assess whether a state law is an
outlier that is rarely enforced at the local level; (3) assess best
practices at the local level to influence the appropriate consti-
18 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
19 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 136 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the Court adopted the "lowest common denominator" in various
standards followed in this country "to avoid causing disruption").
20 d.
21 David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission ofJudicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L.
REv. 859, 878-79 (2009).
22 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
23 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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tutional floor, including in the Fourth Amendment area; and (4)
use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional norm
development. In Part II, I explore examples of each.
Indeed, I will argue that the concern with judicial ability to
assess local practices has been honored largely in the breach.
To provide one high profile example, the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Bush v. Gore heavily emphasized the inconsistencies in
practices for conducting the Presidential vote recount from
county to county and also among recount teams within single
counties.2 4 The ruling has been strongly criticized and its prec-
edential value is unclear from the text of the ruling itself.2 5
However, the concern with arbitrary and discriminatory prac-
tices and patterns is far from unique to the election law con-
text.26 Indeed, looking at law and practices at the local level
may sometimes answer objections to relying on state-level law
or practice. States may not be the most accurate signals of
state legal practice in situations when decision making is more
focused at the local level. 2 7
In Part III, I turn to the methodological issues raised by
using local evidence in constitutional interpretation. The deci-
sion whether to defer to local practices should itself be evi-
dence-based. For example, the frequent lack of good data
about county practices is often a significant obstacle to using
such evidence to inform constitutional interpretation. Judicial
reliance on local law and practice should not be, but sometimes
has been, quite anecdotal and ill-informed. This Article de-
scribes burgeoning research examining county-level data and
assesses the state of that research and the areas in which
further data is needed. Ultimately, in this Article, I set out an
24 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000).
25 See Markenzy Lapointe, Bush v. Gore: Equal Protection Turned on its Head,
Perhaps for a Good Though Unintended Reason, 2 WYo. L. REV. 435, 479 (2002);
David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1427, 1452-74
(2006). The Court stated that its ruling was "limited to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities." Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. See generally Chad Flan-
ders, Please Don't Cite this Casel: The Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116
YALE L.J. Pocket Part 141 (2006) (discussing the confusion of lower courts in
interpreting Bush v. Gore).
26 For a Note arguing that Bush v. Gore should inform analysis of the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty, see Andrew Ditchfield, Challenging the Intrastate
Disparities in the Application of Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801,
802-03 (2007).
27 There is another advantage of relying on local government, which I develop
in Part III: unlike state governments, which have sovereign immunity and cannot
be sued for damages for violating the constitutional rights of individuals, local
governments are liable, and could therefore be more accountable and likely to
adhere to constitutional norms.
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empirical research and a constitutional law agenda for better
use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation.
I
DISAGGREGATING THE STATES
Examination of state law is pervasive in constitutional law
despite concerns raised regarding the competence of federal
judges to assess state law and the relevance of state law to
federal constitutional interpretation questions. Many of the
most significant Supreme Court rulings interpreting the U.S.
Constitution do so while citing precedent from state law. The
Justices often include in their analysis some discussion of the
numbers of states adopting law consistent or inconsistent with
the advanced constitutional interpretation. Some of the rea-
sons for examining state law have to do with the status of
states as sovereigns, and such reasoning does not translate to
support similar treatment of local law. However, when one
closely examines the supporting arguments, many of the rea-
sons for focusing solely on state-level lawmaking are not sover-
eignty-related. As sovereignty-based justifications erode, the
case for a sharp distinction between the treatments of state
and local practices weakens. This Part begins with an overview
of the uses of state law in constitutional interpretation and
then turns to the normative rationales for that usage before
turning to the sources for law at the local level.
A. Uses of State Law in Constitutional Interpretation
The Supreme Court has looked to state law in several dif-
ferent ways and using a range of different methods. There are a
series of important questions to ask about when and whether
state law should be used, none of which have answers that are
consistent across areas of Supreme Court doctrine. These
questions include:
What type of consensus matters?
State law may or may not be a useful measure depending
on what type of consensus matters for constitutional purposes.
The Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has long held,
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." 28 Whether state
law is a good or bad marker for the standards of decency in
society is a difficult question.
28 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
862 [Vol. 104:855
LOCAL EVIDENCE
When is current state law relevant and when is old state
law relevant?
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court noted how few
states permitted assisted suicide in finding the asserted due
process right was not "fundamental."2 9 A "fundamental" right
might demand quite a bit of consensus, perhaps over a long
period of time, to obtain that status. In other areas, the Court
is more concerned with current practice and whether a new
constitutional interpretation or rule might disrupt it. In Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court may assess reasonableness of
searches by examining state legislation regarding subjects as
diverse as warrantless arrests and state rules of evidence.3 0 In
Sixth Amendment cases, the Court has cited to state practices
regarding size of juries and whether factfinding is by a judge or
ajury.3 1 In Ring v. Arizona, a Sixth Amendment ruling on state
statutes permitting judicial imposition of the death penalty, the
Court noted how "the great majority of States responded to this
Court's Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of
aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those
determinations to the jury."32
What if the law in the states is influx?
To take a prominent example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the
Supreme Court noted that about half the states at that time
criminalized homosexual sodomy.3 3 In Lawrence v. Texas, the
Court overruled Bowers and found that the Bowers court had
wholly "overstated" the prior practice by focusing on which
states had laws on the book and not on how often such laws
were actually enforced.3 4 In the Eighth Amendment area, in
which the Court is focused on contemporary standards of de-
cency, in recent cases the Court has examined not just a count
of how many states have statutes on the books but the "direc-
tion" of movement among state legislatures to or from some
type of statute. The Court has also focused on subsets of states
as relevant when considering the degree of state law adoption
29 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
30 E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980) (considering trends in
state legislation on warrantless entries into private homes); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (considering trends in state evidentiary rules requiring ex-
clusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence).
31 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607-08 (2002); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 98 (1970).
32 Ring, 536 U.S. at 607-08.
33 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986).
34 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
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of a type of measure. For example, the Court has noted that
there would be little need for states in which no executions
have been carried out in decades to reconsider their death
penalty statutes, and therefore such statutes might not "count"
when taking the measure of the law in the states.3 5
What evidence should be cited of the existence or usage of
state law?
In the substantive due process context and in equal protec-
tion cases, the Supreme Court has similarly focused on how
many states have statutes on the books, but sometimes the
Court does more than a "nose-count." The Justices sometimes
also ask whether those statutes are enforced and how many
sentences are actually imposed under those statutes (if they
are criminal statutes).3 6 The Justices have also considered
whether to count a state with a statute on the books, but which
has been found unconstitutional by the state supreme court.37
Timing can also matter, such as when the Justices have asked
how recently state statutes were adopted, perhaps treating
statutes that have lingered on the books for a long time as a
relic of an earlier era, but more recent adoption as a sign that a
type of statute retains popularity.38
What level of state law adoption matters?
The underlying constitutional right at issue may demand
more or less strength of state law support. In the Eighth
Amendment cases concerning the death penalty, for example,
the Supreme Court refers to "national consensus" as the stan-
dard. That standard calls for very strong evidence of state law
and practice. However, the Justices have disputed whether
that consists in a majority of the states, or a majority of the
relevant death penalty states, or something far more demand-
ing than that. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court emphasized:
35 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
36 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982) (noting that there were only three
individuals on death row in the U.S. in the relevant category of non-direct partici-
pant felony murderers).
37 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 423-25 (2008) (not counting
Florida, where although the state death penalty statute includes child rape as
death eligible, "the Supreme Court of Florida held the death penalty for child
sexual assault to be unconstitutional").
38 See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16 ("[Tihe complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct . .. executions [of mentally
retarded persons] provides powerful evidence that today our society views men-
tally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.").
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"44 States have not made child rape a capital offense."39 Yet
that was an overstatement in the sense that many of those
were states that no longer retained the death penalty for any
criminal offenses. In Graham v. Florida, the Court identified
only thirteen states that had banned life without parole for at
least some juvenile offenses, but the Court found that the prac-
tice nevertheless violated the Eighth Amendment. 40 Strict
nose-counting clearly does not explain those outcomes.
As the sections that follow will discuss, these same ques-
tions are important when the courts look to local practices
when interpreting the Constitution. However, these questions
have not been asked or answered as openly or with as much
attention to methodological concerns.
B. Norms and Nose-Counting
What are the purposes of assessing state law during con-
stitutional interpretation? In some areas, such as the Eighth
Amendment cases concerning whether punishment is cruel
and unusual, the doctrine itself asks about the existence of
"national consensus" on an issue, which therefore calls for
some assessment of state law.4 1 In Glucksberg, the Court
asked how many states permitted assisted suicide when decid-
ing whether a candidate for substantive due process protection
was a "fundamental" right.42 State law was evidence of how
lawmakers treated the right.
In other areas, though, the doctrine does not as clearly call
for such an assessment, though the courts find it valuable for
other reasons. One reason courts may look to state law is to
assess what degree of disruption would result if a new federal
right or interpretation of the constitution is adopted. In other
contexts, judges may defer to state practices because they be-
lieve that state judges or lawmakers may have more expertise
in an area and may be more likely to have the correct answers.
Justice Sotomayor, in Kansas v. Carr, emphasized this func-
tion of federalism-based deference in a ruling regarding a Kan-
sas procedure in death penalty trials.4 3 Justice Sotomayor
39 554 U.S. at 423.
40 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
41 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423.
42 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
43 Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 647-48 (2016) ("We intervene in an intra-
state dispute between the State's executive and its judiciary rather than entrust-
ing the State's structure of government to sort it out. ... And we lose valuable
data about the best methods of protecting constitutional rights-a particular
concern in cases like these, where the federal constitutional question turns on the
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explained: "[The role of state courts as innovators] is particu-
larly important in the criminal arena because state courts pre-
side over many millions more criminal cases than their federal
counterparts and so are more likely to identify protections im-
portant to a fair trial."4 4 Similarly, Eric Posner and Cass Sun-
stein have argued that broadly held interpretations or views
may not only deserve deference, they may be more likely to be
correct.4 5 The states may act as laboratories for experimenta-
tion that over time reach sound or even correct answers.
One might assume that a useful component of federalism
would involve some deference to state lawmaking, including by
asking whether some type of state law is a common one for
which a constitutional challenge might disrupt widely-accepted
state practice. However, some have criticized the use of infor-
mation about state law in constitutional interpretation. One
source of criticism relates to what was discussed above: that it
is hard to decide in any objective fashion what counts as suffi-
cient consensus among the states.4 6 Others more broadly ar-
gue that state constitutionalism should be robust and is an
important source for informed law.4 7 These debates, which
remain unresolved and involve deeper questions about the role
of evidence and federalism in constitutional interpretation, are
far more developed than debates about the role of evidence and
localism in constitutional interpretation.
C. Counting Localities
There are more than 39,000 localities in the United States,
with over 19,000 municipal governments, over 16,500 town-
ships, and over 3,000 counties, according to the most recent
U.S. Census Bureau data.4 8 When referring broadly to locali-
ties or counties in this Article, I include other types of local
'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, an empirical question best answered
with evidence from many state courts.").
44 Id. at 648.
45 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 131, 142-46 (2006).
46 Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1089,
1091-93, 1106 (2006).
47 For a defense, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 17, 18 (2009). For a broader argument in favor of robust state constitu-
tionalism, see Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutional-
ism, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1147, 1148 (1993).
48 NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, NUMBER OF MUNIcIPAL GOVERNMENTS AND POPULA-
TION DISTRIBUnON, http://www.nic.org/number-of-municipal-governments-popu
lation-distribution [https://perma.cc/6VLS-7BQCI (last visited Jan. 11, 2018).
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administrative units, particularly incorporated municipalities
or cities, as well as parishes, districts, and other types of units.
One criticism of a legal focus on federal law and particularly
constitutional law is that it ignores how central local govern-
ment units are to the day-to-day lives of residents.4 9 Local
government can inform state law and state constitutional law
to varying degrees, depending on the structure of lawmaking in
the state and the practical reality of state politics.50
That said, local government does not have the same sover-
eign status as state government. As the Supreme Court has
often stated: "States traditionally have been accorded the wid-
est latitude in ordering their internal governmental
processes." 5 1 Local government entities are "political subdivi-
sions such as cities and counties that are created by the State,"
and they exist "as convenient agencies for exercising such of
the government powers . . . as may be entrusted to them." 52
Federal constitutional provisions do limit the power and au-
thority of the state over local entities. For example, equal pro-
tection and voting rights may not be infringed upon. However,
the background presumption is that local entities are creatures
of state law. For that reason, the Court has often emphasized
state law sources as more authoritative and permanent.5 3 The
Supreme Court has also sometimes suggested that local gov-
ernment is less to be trusted in matters of constitutional inter-
pretation. As the Court put it, "small and local authority may
feel less sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agen-
cies of publicity may be less vigilant in calling it to account."54
If so, as I develop, looking at whether local practices are atypi-
cal should matter in the analysis, and similarly, whether local
practices are common and representative should matter in the
analysis. The decision whether to defer to local practices
should be evidence-based.
49 See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a
New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
187, 218 (1996) ("Court decisions have recognized the key role of localities with-
out explicitly saying so.").
50 Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627,
644-45 (2001).
51 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 475 (1982).
52 Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (quoting Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907)).
53 See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Edue. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 362-63 (2009)
(holding that municipalities are creatures of the State, and thus state statute,
rather than municipal ordinance, controls).
54 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943).
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D. Localism Without Evidence
Despite the contingent status of local government entities,
in a series of cases, Supreme Court Justices have emphasized
the importance of local autonomy in constitutional interpreta-
tion. There is a large literature on localism and the degree to
which the Court emphasizes it. But localism is not my subject
in this Article. What is important to note is that typically in
opinions that do describe a need to defer to local government
decisions, the Court does not solicit or attempt to measure the
views of local government necessarily, but nevertheless inter-
prets the Constitution to defer to local interests.5 5
The Supreme Court and other federal courts should not
make such rulings that defer to the local in a largely uncritical
fashion. When turning from the national to the local, some-
times the Court has emphasized that a diversity of local prac-
tices is unproblematic or should even be embraced. For
example, the Supreme Court ruled in Missouri v. Lewis that "[ihf
diversities of laws . . . may exist in the several States without
violating the equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment,
there is no solid reason why there may not be such diversities
in different parts of the same State."5 6 The Court has approved
funding laws that provide very different resource levels to pub-
lic schools based on county districting.5 7 Instead, I would ar-
gue, the Court should conduct a careful examination of that
variation in resource levels and assess whether it is arbitrary.
55 Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Gov-
ernment: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 83, 85
(1986) ("Given that the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment allows courts to limit state
sovereignty in order to vindicate federal constitutional rights, why should the
sovereignty of localities, which are mere subdivisions of states, limit the reach of
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment when states' sovereignty cannot?").
56 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879); see also Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171, 177 (1915) ("While such regulations are subject to judicial scrutiny upon
fundamental grounds, yet a considerable latitude of discretion must be accorded
to the law-making power; and so long as the regulation in question is not shown to
be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons
similarly situated in the particular district, the district itself not appearing to have
been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law, or a denial of the equal protection of
the laws, within the meaning of the [Fourteenth] Amendment."); Hayes v. Mis-
souri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) ("[Tihe state has the right to make political subdivi-
sions of its territory for municipal purposes, and to regulate their local
government; and that, as respects the administration of justice, it may establish
one system of courts for cities and another for rural districts. And we may add
that the systems of procedure in them may be different, without violating any
provision of the [F]ourteenth (Almendment.").
57 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
In other areas, the Supreme Court has avoided discussing
the local government implications or bases for its rulings.
Such rulings raise the concern that local evidence is not even
being considered. Scholars have argued that the Court dis-
cusses the local law when it is convenient and ignores the local
law when it is troublesome; Joan Williams has called this a
type of "forum-shifting," not by litigants, but by "shift[ing]
power among different levels of government."5 8 Professor Rich-
ard Schragger has argued that local government is an impor-
tant but neglected constitutional actor in the Establishment
Clause context where "much of Religion Clause doctrine has
been forged in conflicts that directly implicate the traditional
powers of local government."59 Schragger criticizes the Su-
preme Court for not distinguishing between national and local
regulation of religion, claiming that this invites more damaging
centralized regulation as opposed to local municipal power.6 0
The local preferences of counties and cities do seem to
matter more, and receive more explicit acknowledgment by the
Supreme Court, in areas that are seen as traditionally subject
to such local regulation. As Justice William J. Brennan fa-
mously asked in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego, if
"a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a
planner?"6 1 The Supreme Court's rulings regarding zoning de-
cisions and land use matters adopted a highly deferential stan-
dard, making it unnecessary to engage much with the content
of local law; the idea was to defer to local preferences. 62
Then again, the Court's direction is not fully consistent in
the land use and takings area, either. Recent rulings have
adopted less deferential standards in cases concerning the
Takings Clause and so-called regulatory takings, in which local
land use regulations affect property.6 3 Such rulings may re-
flect an abiding concern with localism: that the local law does
not deserve deference if localities are abusing the rights of indi-
viduals or of groups. Dissenting from the 2013 ruling in Koontz
v. St. Johns River Water Management District, Justice Elena
Kagan expressed a concern that the Court, by relaxing its tradi-
tional deference, "threatens to subject a vast array of land-use
58 Williams, supra note 55, at 87-88.
59 Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 HAR. L. REV. 1810, 1813 (2004).
60 See id. at 1818.
61 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
63 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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regulations, applied daily in States and localities throughout
the country, to heightened constitutional scrutiny."6 4
My focus is not on when localism should matter, but that
the question whether and how to defer to the local should be, in
my view, informed by empirical evidence. As described in this
part, there is a literature and a practice of relying on state
evidence when considering the role of federalism in constitu-
tional interpretation. The relevance of evidence in considering
the role of localism raises different questions. If deference risks
constitutional rights violations in the view of the majority, then
it is understandable that such deference would be restrained,
but more must be known about the variation, content, and
effects of local government policies. In the next Part, I turn to a
series of concrete examples in which local evidence is consid-
ered in constitutional law at varying levels of sophistication
and for several different purposes.
II
EXAMPLES OF LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The use of local evidence in constitutional law is a robust
part of constitutional practice, if not theory. In this Part, I turn
to areas in which constitutional law is to some degree already
informed by local law and practice. Sometimes, local sources
inform the courts. At other times, to be sure, they do not.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes expressed skepti-
cism at the value of examining local practices at all. The result
of that analysis can suggest a "crazy quilt" of local practices
that are not suited to inform the "uniform 'law of the land.'"6 5
Nevertheless, before deciding what the uniform rule should be,
even if it is just a constitutional floor, it is important, I argue, to
understand what the local practices are, whether they are uni-
form or a "crazy quilt," and what that means for interpretation
at the federal level.
In this Part, I make the case that looking to local govern-
ment is not only possible and sometimes done, but it can ad-
vance constitutional analysis and interpretation. It can make
constitutional law better. In Part III, I will then turn towards a
more principled and empirically informed approach towards
relying on local government evidence, which is so lacking in the
64 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 620 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
65 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court's largely inconsistent approach towards the
problem.
In this Part, I describe how local evidence may be relevant
to (1) define the constitutional right itself by using local infor-
mation to influence constitutional norms; (2) assess whether
the right is violated by using local evidence to inform the analy-
sis; and (3) decide what the appropriate remedy is for a consti-
tutional violation. In constitutional interpretation, each of
those three decisions may be linked. I also classify four types
of use of local evidence in constitutional law, in which courts:
(1) examine patterns of local law and practice, most promi-
nently in the death penalty area; (2) examine best practices at
the local level to influence the appropriate constitutional floor,
including in the Fourth Amendment area; (3) examine county-
level enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier
that is rarely enforced at the local level; and (4) use local reme-
dies and needs to inform constitutional norm-development, in-
cluding in Fourteenth Amendment cases. These uses are
related, and they broadly focus on patterns of local law and
practice, but also sometimes the quality of local law and
practice.
Before turning to examples of this consideration of local
evidence, I note as a preliminary matter that local governments
cannot invoke the U.S. Constitution as against states under
the rule of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.66 That rule ensures that
local government actors are not direct constitutional actors as
against states. However, local government actors are neverthe-
less crucial constitutional litigants. Local government can be
sued and held civilly accountable for federal constitutional vio-
lations by its officials, without the benefit of state sovereign
66 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). For an insightful critical analysis of the doc-
trine, see Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 5 (2012). See also Gomilion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
344-45 (1960) ("Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state
power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States
Constitution."); David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing
the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2232 (2006) (arguing that the "distinctive
legal status of cities might justify affording them an important degree of latitude to
challenge the constitutionality of state statutes"); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting
by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005) (arguing that individuals with a
minority view within a polity as a whole may enjoy a local majority on a decision
making body, and can thus dissent to the majority via a state decision); Richard
C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political
Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 395-96, 407-09 (2002)
(noting the dual status of local governments as "creatures of the state with no
independent .. . constitutional role," and as "sovereign political entities entitled to
constitutional protection").
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immunity, under the Supreme Court's doctrine in Monell v.
Department of Social Services.6 7 As a result of that doctrine
interpreting the central civil rights statute, cities and counties
are common defendants in constitutional litigation. A range of
constitutional doctrines developed by taking interests of local
government into account because local government is the liti-
gant. Several such doctrines are developed in this Part.
Local evidence can also inform constitutional law; that is
the subject of this Part. Should local laws, policies, or legal
practices matter when conducting constitutional interpreta-
tion? There are a number of constitutional rulings that involve
challenges to municipal ordinances or local government actors
but do not dwell on the subject. And if local government should
matter, how should it matter? After all, some answers to the
questions posed about the use of state law in constitutional
cases would come out differently if the court was focused in-
stead upon counties as the relevant unit of inquiry. For some
questions, state law may seem distant from the locus of local
decision making. Counties may be particularly important ar-
eas for focus in matters in which law and policymaking is itself
focused at the local level. For example, criminal law, land use,
and even areas traditionally seen as federal, like immigration
enforcement, are all heavily impacted by local decisions.6 8 As I
will describe in this Part, a careful analysis of local practices
can improve decision making and add valuable information to
constitutional interpretation and analysis.
A. Constitutional Criminal Procedure
In general, criminal justice is highly localized in the United
States; it is a fragmented system. Although state law defines
criminal offenses and sentences, the larger work of arresting
offenders, charging them, convicting them, and supervising
them post-conviction falls to counties. The trial courts, prose-
cutor's offices, police agencies, and defense offices are all usu-
ally governed almost entirely locally. County priorities and
67 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
68 On immigration enforcement and wide variation in local practice as be-
tween different large urban counties, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for
Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126,
1222 (2013) ("American criminal justice plays out at the local level. At the same
time, federal immigration enforcement increasingly takes place in partnership
with local police, prosecutors, jailers, and probation officers. The consequences of
this new dynamic are surprisingly understudied."). See also David Alan Sklansky,
Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 157, 202
(2012) (describing the merged system of criminal law and immigration
enforcement).
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policies matter enormously to style of policing, charging deci-
sions by prosecutors, resources for defense lawyers, and ap-
proaches adopted by judges. For those reasons, constitutional
criminal procedure is a particularly ripe area for careful con-
sideration of local practices in interpretation. As the sections
that follow will describe, several areas provide important exam-
ples of use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation.
1. Local Enforcement Patterns and the Eighth
Amendment
The death penalty is governed by a complex body of consti-
tutional regulation under the Eighth Amendment. One reason
why the death penalty is an area that can particularly benefit
from local constitutional interpretation is that in its decades-
long modern jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has increas-
ingly looked not just to state-level practices but also local prac-
tices. These cases provide an example of the second type of use
of local evidence that I set out in this Part: assessing whether a
right is violated by using local evidence to inform the analysis,
and examining patterns of local law and practice to do so.
In the past, the Supreme Court looked to states and not
localities. The Justices highlighted how, for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes, "'Iflirst' among the 'objective indicia that reflect
the public attitude toward a given sanction' are statutes passed
by society's elected representatives." 69 Rulings therefore asked
how many states adopted death penalty statutes of a given type
to assess contemporary attitudes. The Court's concern that
the death penalty may be imposed arbitrarily, in a manner that
"smacks of little more than a lottery system"70 or that is "so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed," 7 ' dates back to its ruling
in Furman v. Georgia. There, the Court found the death penalty
unconstitutional in 1972, only to reverse course in Gregg v.
Georgia and companion cases in 1976, having been assured
that new, more detailed state-level statutes would make death
sentences more predictable and informed. 72 Focusing on state
death penalty statutes, the Court has not often cited to county-
69 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)).
70 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
72 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (stating that "the concerns
expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance").
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level death sentencing practices in its Eighth Amendment
cases.
This largely state-level focus has changed over time to fo-
cus more on the local level. The Supreme Court has increas-
ingly cited to the practices of sentencing juries and charging
practices by prosecutors as relevant in addition to state-level
statutes. Dissenting in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Antonin
Scalia noted: "[W]e have, in our determination of society's
moral standards, consulted the practices of sentencing juries:
Juries 'maintain a link between contemporary community val-
ues and the penal system' that this Court cannot claim for
itself."7 3 This concern with the practical reality ofjury decision
making dates back to the Furman v. Georgia ruling itself. Jus-
tice Byron White, in his opinion, emphasized that state stat-
utes are not a sufficient guide to current death penalty
practices: "Legislative 'policy' is thus necessarily defined not by
what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges
do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon
them."7 4 In other rulings, the Justices have more strongly em-
phasized the presence or absence of state statutes as the best
evidence for current death penalty practices.
The Eighth Amendment relevance of counties is changing
as increasingly fine-grained data about death sentencing prac-
tices makes its way into the courts. As noted in the Introduc-
tion, in a dissent in 2015, Justice Breyer raised the issue
directly in Glossip v. Gross, writing:
Geography also plays an important role in determining who
is sentenced to death... . Between 2004 and 2009, for exam-
ple, just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the coun-
try) accounted for approximately half of all death sentences
imposed nationwide. 7
Justice Breyer added that where, "[tihe Eighth Amendment for-
bids punishments that are cruel and unusual. . . . Perhaps
more importantly, in the last two decades, the imposition and
implementation of the death penalty have increasingly become
unusual." 76 Justice Breyer called for full briefing on the ques-
tion of whether the death penalty is now cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment, and when that briefing occurs,
73 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 181).
74 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
75 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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"data-driven arbitrariness review" may take on a more promi-
nent role, with the availability of detailed county-level data.7 7
Not only is the doctrine amenable to local-level analysis,
but there is a growing body of empirical data available to inform
the doctrine. In recent years, just a few dozen counties have
accounted for the bulk of death sentences imposed nationwide.
Scholars have conducted detailed research collecting data on
the use of the death penalty at the county level using data that
was not available when the federal government only reported
state-level data on death sentencing. The first study to do so
comprehensively, the landmark "Broken System" study led by
Professor James Liebman, Valerie West, and Jeffrey Fagan,
examined death sentencing from 1977 through 1995 and
found a concentration of death sentences in a small minority of
counties.7 8 The researchers noted that "[elven in Texas, nearly
60% of its counties did not impose a single death sentence in
the period."7 9 A more recent report analyzing executions in
1976, from data collected by Professor Frank Baumgartner,
found that only 2% of counties in the U.S. were responsible for
a majority of capital cases, and 85% of the counties in the U.S.
had not had a single execution in over 45 years.80
A study by Professor Robert J. Smith of recent death
sentences between 2004 and 2009 found even greater concen-
tration as death sentences have declined in number, noting
that: "The geographic distribution of death sentences reveals a
clustering around a narrow band of counties: roughly 1% of
counties in the United States returned death sentences at a
rate of one or more sentences per year from 2004 to 2009."1
Thus, Smith noted, Los Angeles County, California sentenced
77 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications,
92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 254 (2012). Professor Smith also called for collection of more
detailed charging data regarding potentially capital cases in order to better ex-
amine what factors influenced county-level processing and outcomes in death-
eligible cases. See id. at 256.
78 James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority's Burden: The
Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 255, 312 (2011).
79 Id. at 264. Further, data analysis of appellate and post-conviction rever-
sals showed that state courts were more likely to overturn death sentences from
urban than rural and small-town jurisdictions. See Andrew Gelman et al., A
Broken Systen The Persistent Pattern of Reversals of Death Sentences in the
United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 247 (2004).
80 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions
[https://perma.cc/2UMD-P5NF (last visited Oct. 21, 2018); Richard C. Dieter,
The 2% Death Penalty: How a Minority of Counties Produce Most Death Cases at
Enormous Costs to All, DEATH PENALTy INFO. CTR. (October 2013), http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
87DS-WGQ9].
81 Smith, supra note 77, at 228.
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the same number of people to death in 2009 as the entire state
of Texas, and Maricopa County, Arizona sentenced more than
the entire state of Alabama. 82 Crossing county lines can make
a huge difference; for example, the chances of being sentenced
to death in Baltimore County were 13 times higher than in
Baltimore City, when Maryland had the death penalty. 3 In
Texas, Harris County accounts for the vast bulk of the state's
death row, far out of proportion to its population or to the
number of murders occurring there.8 A "small set of counties"
are imposing death sentences, which means that "it is the prac-
tices, policies, habits, and political milieu of local prosecutors,
jurors, and judges that dictate whether a given defendant in
the United States-whatever his crime-will be charged, tried,
convicted, and sentenced capitally and executed."8 5 What ex-
plains which counties are the most prone to impose death
sentences?
Brandon Garrett, Alexander Jakubow, and Ankur Desai
conducted research analyzing the entire period of modem
death sentencing, collecting data at the county level on death
sentencing from 1990 through present. That data is described
in an article and in a recent book, End of its Rope: How Killing
the Death Penalty Can Revive Criminal Justice.6 The research-
ers describe a dramatic decline in death sentencing wherein
only thirty-nine people were sentenced to death in 2017 and
only thirty-one in 2016, record lows compared with over 300
sentenced to death in the 1990s. 8 7 Only twenty-eight counties
sentenced people to death in 2016, as compared with over 200
counties per year in the 1990s.8 8 The figure below displays the
number of counties that imposed death sentences from 1990
through 2016.89
82 See id. at 233.
83 RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH
SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION
30-31 (2003).
84 Dieter, supra note 80, at 13-14.
85 Liebman & Clarke, supra note 78, at 262; see also id. at 265 n.40 (report-
ing "from 1973 to 1995, sixty-six counties imposed 2569 of the 5131 total death
sentences").
86 Garrett, Jakubow & Desal, supra note 5, at 561; GARRETr, supra note 14, at
138-51.
87 DEATH PENALY INFO. CTR. Facts About the Death Penalty, (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/past/58/2017 [https://perma.cc/TR7A-
MT2V]; Garrett, Jakubow & Desal, supra note 5, at 561.
88 Garrett, Jakubow & Desa, supra note 5, at 561.
89 Id. at 585.
876 [Vol. 104:855
2019] LOCAL EVIDENCE 877
FIG. 1. NUMBER OF COUNTIES WITH DEATH SENTENCES,
1990-2016
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In this empirical work, Garrett, Jakubow, and Desai de-
scribe how death sentencing has almost entirely disappeared
in rural America over the space of fifteen years. In the past
decade, death sentencing has become limited to a scattered
group of larger, more populous and urban counties.9 0 The fig-
ure below illustrates the growing population density among the
shrinking group of counties that impose death sentences.
These counties are also increasingly racially fragmented and
have relatively large black populations.
90 See id. at subpart II.A.
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FIG. 2. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS BY SENTENCING STATUS 9 1
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Death sentencing occurs in counties with higher murder
rates, but it is generally counties with more white murder vic-
tims that engage in death sentencing, while black homicide
victimization is not correlated with death sentencing. 9 2 Finally,
counties that impose death sentences exhibit a powerful inertia
effect such that death sentencing rates are strongly associated
with rates in prior periods.9 3
These results have implications for constitutional regula-
tion of the death penalty. They also raise the question of
whether the death penalty has become arbitrary under the
Eighth Amendment.9 4 To date, such arguments have largely
not been considered in federal courts, while state courts have
only recently begun to engage with them. To be sure, the Su-
preme Court has considered and rejected empirical evidence
concerning death sentencing patterns before, and this raises
the concern that, even now that more research has been done,
county-level patterns may not matter to the Justices in the
future. In its ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court
considered a state-specific study of Georgia death sentencing
91
92
93
94
See i. at 131.
See i. at subpart II.C.
See id. at subpart II.E.
See id. at subpart III.D.
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patterns.9 5 The data showed a strong correlation between the
race of the victim and the likelihood that a defendant would be
sentenced to death. The Justices emphasized that this data
was focused at the state level, and not the county or the case in
which the defendant had been sentenced. In fact, in McCles-
key, county-level data revealed the same race disparity. Fulton
County, Georgia, in which Warren McCleskey was prosecuted,
had 32 death-eligible prosecutions, and a defendant killing a
white victim was 3.6 times more likely to get the death penalty
than if the victim was black.9 6 The Justices, however, were
more broadly skeptical of such empirical data, particularly
where there is so much discretion built into a range of decision
makers including the prosecutor, the judge, and the jurors,
who make decisions whether to bring cases and ultimately
what sentence to impose. The Justices' reasoning rejected the
relevance of empirics, and only modestly engaged with the real-
ity of local practice and dynamics when making sentencing
decisions.
However, in recent years, state courts have engaged with
empirical evidence concerning death sentencing practices.
Most recently, the Washington Supreme Court, applying state
constitutional law to find the death penalty unconstitutional,
relied on a statistical analysis of death sentencing patterns
chiefly focused on racial disparities in sentencing at the county
level.9 7 A concurring opinion focused on county-level dispari-
ties as well, detailing the findings of studies of death sentenc-
ing in the state, and emphasizing: "In the majority of our 39
counties, no death penalty has ever been sought. The current
death row population arose from just 6 counties."9 3 In a 2015
ruling, the Connecticut Supreme Court decision cited empirical
analysis of death sentences to find its death penalty retroac-
tively unconstitutional, chiefly focusing on the rarity of
sentences.9 9
Does local evidence, when used in constitutional interpre-
tation, more faithfully apply the command of the Eighth
Amendment? Perhaps the modern empirical case provides a
more powerful demonstration of arbitrariness in death sen-
95 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
96 David C. Baldus et al., McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): Denial, Avoidance, and
the Legitimization of Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Pen-
alty, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 232 n.6 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds.,
Foundation Press 2009).
97 See State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018).
98 Id. at 646 (Johnson, J., concurring).
99 See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 49 (Conn. 2015).
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tencing through county-level data and a steep decline in the
use of the death penalty. County lines are highly salient, if not
completely determinative, in practice. 0 0 Should they matter
under the Constitution? This is not an argument based on
localism, or a notion that localities deserve deference. Indeed,
these data show that outlier localities do not deserve deference
because their practices are grossly out of line with that of other
localities, even in leading death sentencing states. These dis-
parities raise a constitutional concern under the Eighth
Amendment that the imposition of the death penalty has be-
come far rarer and more arbitrary than in the past. That out-
lier concern places the approach in the third sub-category of
use of local evidence, where the patterns in local enforcement
may show that the state law is itself an outlier that is rarely
used. This concern is even more severe when one looks at how
few counties even within the most seemingly staunch death
penalty states that currently impose death sentences. Whether
Justices other than Justice Breyer will want to address these
concerns in future years is an open question.
2. Local Norm Development and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment doctrine regulating the use of force
by police, including deadly force, is another area in which local
constitutional interpretation is ripe for reconsideration. This
area is one in which courts have sometimes, but not often,
used the first category of analysis that I describe in this Part:
examining local evidence to determine whether a constitutional
right was violated. In this context, courts sometimes have ex-
amined best practices at the local level to influence the appro-
priate constitutional floor. In deciding whether to grant relief
on a due process right in criminal procedure cases, the Court
typically does not conduct a cost benefit analysis under Ma-
thews v. Eldridge,101 but rather asks whether it is a fundamen-
tal right that has been traditionally protected by states.
Sometimes, however, the Court also looks at local government
rules not to assess their usage empirically, but to survey what
is accepted local practice. The Fourth Amendment is a surpris-
ing example, but the manner in which the Court has looked at
100 See generally Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]ithin a death penalty State, the imposition of the death penalty
heavily depends on the county in which a defendant is tried." (emphasis omitted)).
101 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443-46 (1992) (holding that courts
should exercise substantial deference to state legislative judgments because
states have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure, thus signifl-
cantly limiting the Mathews balancing test in criminal law cases).
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local government practices has changed over time in a way that
provides a troubling object lesson.
One prominent example of local constitutional interpreta-
tion occurs in Tennessee v. Garner, a seminal case regarding
the use of deadly force by police officers under the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Supreme Court noted that: "In evaluating the
reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amend-
ment, we have also looked to prevailing rules in individual ju-
risdictions."1 0 2 The case itself involved a police officer shooting
a non-dangerous fleeing felon, as permitted under a state stat-
ute and the traditional common law rule. But the Court did not
simply rely on state statutes and carefully examined police
department policies. The Court noted that "a majority of police
departments in this country have forbidden the use of deadly
force against nonviolent suspects."10 3 The Court mentioned
examples of police policies, including policies of the New York
City Police Department and forty-four other law enforcement
agencies.1 0 4 The Court also cited research on best practices by
police organizations such as the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the accreditation criteria of the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies
(CALEA). 0 5 Thus, the Court used local practices to inform
best practices in the Fourth Amendment area before deciding
the constitutional interpretation to adopt.
The ruling in Garner was something of a high-water mark
in the attention that the Supreme Court paid to local police
practices. In the decades since, the Justices have instead em-
phasized the discretion of individual officers rather than police
department-level practices and supervision. In doing so, the
Justices have disregarded evidence that a single police depart-
ment's policy or practices are outlier practices that are danger-
ous, unwise, or unusual among professional police
departments.
For example, in its ruling in Scott v. Harris, the Justices
reviewed the decision by an officer to end a high-speed chase
by running a vehicle off the road, resulting in severe injuries to
the driver.106 The Justices did not discuss best practices in
any way and suggested that what is justified may depend on
102 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985).
103 Id. at 10-11.
104 See id. at 18-19.
105 See i. at 18-19.
106 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).
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what is reasonable in the circumstances.1 0 7 The Justices
never engaged with, much less discussed, policing literature on
the dangers of permitting high-speed chases at all, much less
using ramming techniques to end them in a potentially highly
dangerous fashion. Only Justice Stevens, in dissent, dis-
cussed alternative means for ending high-speed chases.108
Had the Justices engaged with local practices in interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment standard, or in deciding whether
the right had been violated, the opinion in Scott v. Harris might
have looked very different. The International Association of the
Chiefs of Police policy states that: "Officers may not intention-
ally use their vehicle to bump or ram the suspect's vehicle in
order to force the vehicle to a stop off the road or in a ditch."109
Moreover, as Seth Stoughton and I have discussed, the record
was replete with evidence of poor local policy, supervision, and
training.1o Many other recent Supreme Court rulings on po-
lice use of force have done the same. The Justices' ruling in
Sheehan, like that in Harris, entirely failed to engage with what
well-trained officers should do, and what the practices are in
professional agencies, when engaging with mentally ill
individuals.111
There are many structural features of modern civil rights
litigation that draw attention away from questions of sound
local government policy and practice other than the way the
Justices interpret rights. Litigation often focuses on the con-
duct of individual officers and not on local government-level
policy, supervision, and training.1 2 However, as cases like
Garner show, there is room in the doctrine to consider what
sound local police practices are, and use them to inform the
constitutional doctrine. The constitutional rule may be a floor,
but it need not undermine local government efforts to run pro-
fessional police departments.
B. Local Outliers and Substantive Due Process
In rulings concerning substantive due process rights such
as marriage, procreation, family relationships, education, sex-
ual orientation, and other privacy and autonomy-related
rights, the Supreme Court has sometimes looked to local prac-
107 See id.
08 Id. at 396-97, 397 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA.
L. REv. 211, 235 (2017).
IL10 See id. at 234-36.
111 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015).
112 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 109, at 236-38.
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tices and enforcement to get a broad sense of whether a type of
practice is an outlier practice. These cases provide an example
of the third subcategory that I develop in this Part: courts ex-
amining local-level enforcement to assess whether a state law
is an outlier that is rarely enforced at the local level. The Court
has done so when asking whether to recognize a fundamental
substantive due process right in the first instance and when
determining whether a right has been violated.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld state anti-sod-
omy laws and noted, using state nose-counting, that about half
the states had criminalized sodomy.1 13 In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court overruled Bowers and found that the Bowers court
had "overstated" the practice by focusing on state law and that
since the ruling, states had moved away from prohibiting
same-sex conduct.1 1 4 The Court emphasized how rarely any of
those laws on the books were used; even at the time of Bowers,
states like Georgia "had not sought to enforce its law for
decades." 1 5
What Justice Anthony Kennedy could have highlighted
was that it was local prosecutors who were declining to bring
cases to enforce state laws; local decision makers had made
anti-sodomy statutes moribund. Justice Kennedy wrote: "In
those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for
same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of nonen-
forcement with respect to consenting adults acting in pri-
vate."1 16 Again, that nonenforcement would primarily be at the
local prosecution level. Justice Kennedy added: "The State of
Texas admitted in 1994 that as of that date it had not prose-
cuted anyone under those circumstances."117 In Texas, that
nonenforcement was based on decisions chiefly by elected dis-
trict attorneys. In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor similarly emphasized how rarely the law had been
enforced."I
The Supreme Court's ruling in Romer v. Evans finding an
equal protection violation was based on the impact that a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment had on disabling any local laws
113 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986).
114 539 U.S. 558, 570-71 (2003).
115 Id. at 572.
116 Id. at 573.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the provision "has not
been, and in all probability will not be, enforced against private consensual con-
duct between adults" (quoting State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.
1994))).
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from providing anti-discrimination protection based on homo-
sexual, lesbian, or bisexual "orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships."' 1 9 The Court noted that some of the largest
urban centers in Colorado, such as "the cities of Aspen and
Boulder and the city and County of Denver each had enacted
ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions
and activities, including housing, employment, education,
public accommodations, and health and welfare services."I 20
The statewide amendment was designed to strike down at
those local anti-discrimination laws. The Justices emphasized
not just the general far-reaching effects of the statutes, they
surveyed Colorado's state and municipal laws. The majority
noted such laws "follow a consistent pattern" in enumerating
persons or entities that may not discriminate and enumerating
a range of groups or persons that are protected beyond the
Supreme Court's caselaw on groups subject to strict scru-
tiny. 1 2 1 Thus, these statutes and ordinances typically included
an "extensive catalog of traits which cannot be the basis for
discrimination," including sexual orientation.1 2 2 The Court
went on to explain the unique disabilities imposed by the legis-
lation, its breadth, and why it violated rational basis scrutiny
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Romer opinion did somewhat more than the substan-
tive due process rulings to analyze patterns in local govern-
ment practices. What is useful to highlight for these purposes
is that the Justices conducted a brief survey of local ordinances
in Colorado and the content of that local law mattered to the
decision making, while in other areas, the rarity of local govern-
ment enforcement mattered to the ultimate decision. In each of
these cases, local government practices constituted important
evidence used to support a constitutional decision.
C. Local Practices and the Fourteenth Amendment
Much of the body of law that established race discrimina-
tion in the United States post-Reconstruction was enacted at
the local level, in the form of ordinances regulating public ac-
commodations, education, employment, and housing; they
were supplemented by state laws and constitutional provi-
sions, but they enacted racial preferences and segregation lo-
119 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
120 Id. at 623-24.
121 Id. at 628.
122 Id. at 629.
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cally.1 2 3 The Supreme Court's first equal protection ruling, in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, found a San Francisco ordinance regulat-
ing laundries racially discriminatory and unconstitutional be-
cause of evidence that it was enforced by local officials who
applied it only to Chinese-owned laundries. The ordinance was
"applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand."l 2 4
In other contexts, equal protection law has looked to local
government enforcement patterns, but also sought guidance
from local norms. Following Brown v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court remanded in Brown II the question of develop-
ing remedies to district courts due to their "proximity to local
conditions and the possible need for further hearings." 125 Con-
temporary cases found unconstitutionally discriminatory, ra-
cially disparate patterns in local decision making regarding
pupil assignment.1 2 6
Over time, the Supreme Court focused more on the reach
of remedies for equal protection violations. In doing so, the
Court focused on limiting remedies based on the unit of local
government, in this case the school district (which might or
might not correspond with municipal or county lines), and in-
creasingly limited inter-district remedies.1 2 7 As a result, the
case law did not account for practices among counties or pat-
terns across a state; the case law focused on practices within
individual local entities. In that way, the cases were an exam-
ple of use of local evidence to inform remedial questions, and of
the fourth subcategory noted, in which the courts used local
123 Adrian G. Duplantier, The Matter of Racial Differences and Local Police
Legislation, 5 LOY. L. REV. 73, 74-77, 81 (1949).
124 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
125 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
126 Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (describing pattern of
persistent racially disparate student assignments under "freedom of choice" plan
adopted by school district).
127 For decisions affirming broad remedial powers, see Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 198-203 (1973) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1971); for decisions limiting those powers, see, e.g.,
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (holding that it was improper to
impose a multidistrict remedy for single-district de jure segregation); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89, 101 (1995) (explaining that the properjudicial inquiry is
whether the district has remedied vestiges of de jure segregation "to the extent
practicable," not to the "maximum potential"); and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
494 (1992) (holding that the district court may relinquish desegregation control in
incremental stages, and stating that in the absence of a constitutional violation,
the district court had no power to order "[r]acial balance . .. for its own sake"). For
an overview, see James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 283
(1999).
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remedies and needs to inform constitutional norm-
development.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore, finding that
there was an Equal Protection violation in conducting Florida
recounts in the 2000 Presidential election, did emphasize pat-
terns across counties. That ruling emphasized the inconsis-
tencies in practices for conducting the Presidential vote
recount from county to county, as well as among recount teams
within single counties.1 2 8 The decision has been strongly criti-
cized, and the ruling itself makes its precedential value quite
unclear.1 2 9 As a result, it is hard to say whether the Bush v.
Gore decision sets out anything like a model for looking more
carefully at patterns and disparities in local practices. That
ruling, though, provides an example of category one analysis,
in which the court examines patterns of local law and practice.
D. State Cases that Are Local
One area in which local government matters, but only sub
silentio, are cases in which the state interests examined are in
fact largely the work of local government decision makers. The
Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment commandeering cases
provide an example of this phenomenon where the constitu-
tional problem is characterized as a question of state sover-
eignty, but where evidence concerning the preferences and
policies of distinctly local actors could have played an impor-
tant role, had it been considered.
Take the case of Printz v. United States, striking down pro-
visions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act under
the Tenth Amendment as unconstitutionally requiring "state
officers" to take action "in the implementation of federal
law."' 3 0 Although it was local sheriffs in Arizona and Montana
who brought the lawsuit challenging the provisions under the
Act, throughout the opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for
the Court, referred to "state officers" being commanded to en-
force the federal statute, which did refer to state officers in its
text. 11 Were those officers "the police officers of the 50 states,"
as the majority of the Supreme Court pointed out? Are those
128 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000).
129 See Lapointe, supra note 25, at 479; Cole, supra note 25, at 1427,
1452-74. The Court stated that its ruling was "limited to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities." Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. See also Flanders, supra
note 25.
130 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997).
131 See id. at 903-05.
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chiefly "state officers"? Of course not. Very few police in any
state report to state officials of any kind (aside from state troop-
ers and the like); for the most part, police are locally governed
and organized at the city and county level. Only about 8% of
non-federal law enforcement officers work for a state agency;
the vast majority work for local police agencies or sheriffs of-
fices. 1 3 2 The Printz case was not a case of a state being re-
quired to "enact or administer a federal regulatory program,"
but rather local government agencies. The Court barely
touched on the fact that this statute was actually requiring
"state or local officers" to provide enforcement assistance.1 3 3 It
was left to Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissent, to note, al-
though without much development of the point, that the rele-
vant question is whether Congress may "require local law
enforcement officers to perform certain duties during the in-
terim needed for the development of a federal gun control pro-
gram."134 Justice Stevens was the only Justice to recognize
something not adequately appreciated: the Tenth Amendment
cases are localism cases in disguise as federalism cases. If so, I
would argue that evidence about local government practices,
resources, or willingness to participate in the federal scheme in
question should have mattered.
Why does the Supreme Court so often label as federalism
what is in fact localism? One reason may be due to the com-
plexity of the relationship between state and local government.
I would argue that "dual sovereignty" does not adequately cap-
ture the distinctions between state and local government and,
as a result, it does not adequately explain what burdens a
federal scheme may or may not impose on local government
actors. The Court could make its rulings both more practically
relevant and careful if it did attend to those complexities in an
evidence-informed manner. In some areas, the Court does so,
as described in this Part. The next Part turns to the method-
ological issues raised by using local evidence in constitutional
interpretation.
132 Bryan Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement, 2008, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2 (2008), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cs1eaO8
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XVP-V6NK].
133 Printz, 521 U.S. at 926.
134 Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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III
METHODS FOR USING LOCAL EVIDENCE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
There is a family resemblance in each of the areas dis-
cussed in Part II in which local-level regulation and practice
has been important in constitutional interpretation. In each of
those areas, it is local government that makes critical decisions
concerning the rights at stake, whether it is how election re-
counts are conducted, whether to seek the death penalty, or
whether police officers should participate in a federal program.
This Part turns to questions regarding what methods should be
used to assess local law and practice, including how to decide
which types of localities are relevant. Next, this Part describes
the status of local governments as laboratories of experimenta-
tion to develop new policies and potentially influence constitu-
tional norms. Third, this Part asks how one should approach
limiting the actions of outlier counties. Fourth, this Part asks
what empirical data could better inform these questions and it
sets out an empirical research agenda for further study of lo-
cal-level law and practice.
A. Analyzing or Considering Local Law and Practice
Local constitutional law can provide different, and perhaps
better, answers in a range of areas of constitutional interpreta-
tion. In this Article, I have not set out an overarching theory of
constitutional law. I do not argue that local practices always
deserve deference; they may in fact highlight greater conflict
between what localities do and what the constitution demands.
In areas in which courts are simply examining the application
of constitutional text or structure, there may be no need to
examine local practice. Nor, conversely, does it take an ap-
proach in which policy outcomes are crucial to take local con-
stitutional law seriously. Even if projected policy outcomes are
not part of the constitutional analysis, some deference or con-
sideration of local governments as important constitutional ac-
tors could still play an important role.
One reason to do so would be to permit local participation
in developing norms and rules to inform constitutional ques-
tions. Some scholars have argued, for example, that constitu-
tional criminal procedure rules should reflect some deference
to community values and preferences.1 3 5 Others view local ad-
135 Dan M. Kahan &Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Crininal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998).
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ministrative rules as worthy of deference, in order to incentivize
local administrative process and to promote local democratic
engagement in decisions affecting constitutional rights.13 6
Critics of such approaches fear that "political pathologies" are
known to affect local governance, particularly in areas like po-
licing and criminal justice.' 3 7 Without taking a view on an
administrative law-informed approach, for a political process
approach, focused on whether minorities are systematically ex-
cluded from decision making, attending to power dynamics at
the local level may be as important or more so than attending to
such dynamics at the state level. 3 8 Attending to local prac-
tices does not mean deference to or ratification of those local
practices.
Some answers to the questions posed about the use of
state law would come out differently if the court is focused
instead upon localities as the relevant unit of inquiry. When
counting states, there are counting disputes, including, as de-
scribed, questions about which states should be counted, how
they should be counted, and how many states adopting a posi-
tion are sufficient to suggest that their approach should be
given weight in constitutional analysis. The same questions
arise regarding how to count local government, including as
between larger cities and more rural counties, and whether
focusing on population, density, or other features should mat-
ter depending on what question one is asking.
New questions also arise, because while states are very
different from each other, the Constitution does give them
equal sovereignty. Counties are not sovereign, and their status
is very different and is not equal for all purposes under state
law. If one turns to other local actors, such as local school
boards, locally elected prosecutors, or Sheriffs, still additional
questions arise regarding the scope of their authority and sov-
ereignty. Scale should also matter. Richard Schragger points
out that "obviously a city of 6 million persons is different from a
city of 100,000 or a town of 400."139 For some questions, large
urban counties may be the relevant unit, such as questions
136 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1879-81 (2015) (arguing that police agencies should be
governed by the ordinary process of democratic government); Christopher
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 118 (2016) (arguing
that police agencies should be governed by the principles of administrative law).
137 Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369, 372'(2018).
138 Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77
VA. L. REV. 747, 747-48, 772-82 (1991).
139 Schragger, supra note 59, at 1818.
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regarding what policies might be appropriately adopted for reg-
ulation of municipal subway systems or video surveillance. For
other questions, like what policies are appropriate for police
use of force, or what schools should do to assist disabled stu-
dents, practices across a wide range of jurisdictions might be
sensible subjects for careful evaluation.
B. Local Laboratories of Experimentation
Scholars have begun to ask more questions about "who
experiments" when state laboratories of experimentation con-
sider and adopt new policy. The answer is often not state but
rather local governments, whether it is climate change adapta-
tion and resilience planning, immigration, drug enforcement,
or oil and gas development. 14 0 Organizations of local govern-
ment actors, such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, are also
highly influential in policy-making; Judith Resnik, Joshua
Civin, and Joseph Frueh have called these groups translocal
organizations of government actors (TOGAs).141
One often-neglected feature of localities as constitutional
actors is that local government is potentially more accountable
to federal constitutional norms than states. The sovereign im-
munity of states has a perverse and often unnoticed side effect:
It renders states less accountable to constitutional values (al-
though they may still be enjoined through actions under Ex
Parte Young against individual state officials). But in contrast,
municipal "pattern and practice" liability under § 1983 to civil
rights damages actions for their policies and practices makes
local government more directly and derivatively accountable for
constitutional law violations. 1 4 2 This is a point not examined
in the literature. States are treated as sovereign, responsible
for creating and regulating local government, and are therefore
treated as relevant for purposes of federalism in constitutional
doctrine.
Yet in some respects, localities are far more active as con-
stitutional actors (and accountable as constitutional actors).
To be sure, state governments are liable for injunctions if they
engage in unconstitutional executive actions, and state legisla-
140 Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1677
(2014).
141 Judith Resnik et al., Ratftng Kyoto at the Local Level* Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 AmZ.
L. REv. 709, 711 (2008); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Govern-
ments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN L.
REv. 669, 675-76 (2010).
142 See supra subpart I.B for a discussion of Monell liability.
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tion can be constitutionally challenged. 14 3 As a result of Monell
pattern and practice liability, however, there are reasons to
think that cities and counties might be better exemplars of
experimentation with, and perhaps also adherence to, consti-
tutional norms.
What if local government units adopt very different law and
policy from each other? As Richard Briffault has developed, a
defining feature of "our localism" has been conflict between
localities, including as between cities and suburbs, over ques-
tions including school finance and zoning. 1 4 4 Should that con-
flict and the resulting diversity of approaches itself matter more
on some questions than the diversity of approaches as between
states, or the lack thereof? In my view, courts should both
examine local practices but be attentive to conflict and diver-
sity, as with state law and practice. In the death penalty area,
therefore, it is precisely the fact that a small number of coun-
ties are outliers, and appear arbitrary as compared to how the
death penalty is applied across the rest of the state, that lends
support to Eighth Amendment arguments concerning the
practice.
Should local governments matter as laboratories of experi-
mentation?14 5 In many ways, cities and counties are better
situated to engage in experimentation than are states. Munici-
palities are more closely connected with communities and they
are more diverse in their governing arrangements. One con-
cern with experimentation is always that there could be a "race
to the bottom" in which competition and outright conflict re-
sults in negative results.146 That race to the bottom is gener-
ally examined at the state level and not at the local level. There
are perhaps fewer reasons for that concern at the local or
county level, given the greater local accountability in local
government.
That said, if local government engages in abuses that affect
persons that are not part of the political process, then there are
special reasons to intervene and not defer to their practices.
That is what the Department of Justice has done in the past
143 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
144 Richard Briffault, Our Localisrm- Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-24 (1990).
145 See Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications
for the Obama Administration, 62 AiA. L. REV. 237, 267 (2011).
146 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competitior: Rethinking The
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1210, 1210-11 n.1 (1992).
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with local policing agencies.1 4 7 That is also what Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine does; although it is often viewed as
ensuring against state protectionism, in many cases it is local
government that is at issue, and the Dormant Commerce
Clause serves to protect against discrimination in favor of local
business. 148
C. Outlier Localities
Constitutional rulings often seek to identify various types
of "outliers," or states that adopt measures that are infrequent.
Attending to local practices does not mean that local prefer-
ences are necessarily deserving of deference. As Justin Driver
has developed, "constitutional outliers" come in several vari-
eties and the Supreme Court's practice is complex; sometimes
the problem is that a minority of states are "holdouts" that are
the last to retain a practice; sometimes it is a new "upstart"
that breaks the prior mold; sometimes it is a "backup" or an
effort to do something novel to evade a constitutional rule; and
sometimes, in Driver's valuable taxonomy, it is a "throwback"
effort to revive a largely abandoned approach. 149 Each of those
types of outlier treatments is relevant as to localities. A locality
could be a "holdout," retaining a practice that the vast majority
have abandoned. A locality might be a "throwback" reviving a
constitutionally suspect practice.
If there is some consensus on the goal of a constitutional
right, then there may also be consensus that some level of
departure from constitutional norms is an outlier approach
and unconstitutional. In the substantive due process area,
that is in effect what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence when
it concluded that it was vanishingly rare for any locality to
enforce anti-sodomy laws. Indeed, some have questioned
whether Lawrence should be seen as a ruling suppressing state
outliers; as Justin Driver has argued, the case involved "invali-
dation of thirteen state laws." 15 0 However, if the problem is
seen as one that should be understood as not with state law on
the books, but a practice that was in fact highly aberrational at
the local level, then the opinion can properly be seen as an
effort to enforce the Constitution as against outlier localities.
147 Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Police Reform,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (2009).
148 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394
(1994) (striking down municipal waste regulation that required waste to be
processed at local transfer facility).
149 Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 929, 933 (2014).
150 Id. at 990.
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Driver views this as a problem of "nonenforcement" and that
nonenforcement should not necessarily render a practice an
outlier, or as a fallback, that if it is to be considered, it would
raise too many complications to be useful, since one could have
a measure that was adopted in all fifty states but not en-
forced.151 I view the problem very differently. Courts must look
at the right unit of government when conducting constitutional
interpretation. Looking merely at the law on the (state) books
and not how it is operationalized at the relevant (local) level can
entirely miss the constitutional problem.
As I have described, it is not unduly complex but is in fact
an accepted approach in a range of constitutional areas to
focus on local enforcement and nonenforcement. I would
counter that if a measure was in fact adopted in all fifty states,
but arbitrarily and locally enforced only in a few scattered lo-
calities, that it should properly be scrutinized as a potential
"outlier" practice. To be sure, nonenforcement alone is not
necessarily enough to raise red flags. As David Strauss points
out, "some restrictions may be unenforced because they are so
universally accepted that they are hardly ever violated, such as
laws forbidding slavery or cannibalism."l 5 2
However, lack of enforcement, together with a trend away
from the use of a practice, and selective or rare use of a prac-
tice, can all contribute to suspicion that the practice does not
deserve the same deference when facing a constitutional chal-
lenge.153 In the death penalty area, that is what the Court did,
without quite stating as much, in abolishing the juvenile death
penalty, which similarly few localities had imposed in recent
decades, although a quite a bit larger number of states retained
the practice. I have argued that the entire death penalty is now
a phenomenon of a few outlier localities, and for that reason
raises substantial arbitrariness concerns. More research
should be done regarding geographic variation in other areas of
criminal punishment. For example, there is evidence that life
without parole (LWOP) sentences are highly concentrated; in
Texas, the bulk come from Harris County, for example.15 4
151 See id. at 992.
152 Strauss, supra note 21, at 877.
153 Id. at 878.
154 Kert Blakinger, Harris County Leads Texas in Life Without Parole Sentences
as Death Penalty Recedes, Hous. CHRON., https://www.chron.com/news/hous
ton-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-leads-Texas-in-life-without-parole-
12491890.php [https: //perma.cc/37XA-VHBQI (last updated Jan. 14, 2018, 9:24
PM).
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This discussion suggests that the consequences of attend-
ing to local constitutional law is to punish outlier counties, but
we should also think about the converse: how to reward local
governments that adopt successful practices. Courts may re-
ward localities that do address the policy question and attempt
to protect constitutional norms, but suppress approaches that
are poorly designed to do so. One way to reward localities is
through citing to their rules and practices as evidence in favor
of or not in favor of their constitutionality.
However, a better way to reward such localities might be
for state or federal actors to reward them in the form of re-
sources and grant support. The only way to even conduct such
analysis is to produce adequate data on what local-level prac-
tices are and then evaluate them. In few areas have the courts
suggested any such thing. However, research institutes or
granting agencies could insist on such data and provide seed
funding and grant support for localities that do adopt evidence-
based approaches. Non-profits have already done so'15 and
the National Association of Counties has also supported such
efforts, including through a recent "data-driven justice" initia-
tive aimed at reducing reliance on jails. 5 6
One approach towards promoting experimentation in con-
stitutional law is known as democratic experimentalism, which
as Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel explain, involves setting
constitutional floors but encouraging and empirically assess-
ing progress above that floor. Certain Supreme Court decisions
that are expressed in prophylactic terms, like Miranda v. Ari-
zona, can be seen as setting a constitutional floor above which
jurisdictions are free to experiment. 5 7 In response to the
Court's decision in Miranda, Dorf and Sabel note: "there has
been almost no actual experimentation."15 8 In fact, since they
wrote their Article, there has been a great deal of experimenta-
tion, but little of it that has been in any identifiable way in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda, and much
of it occurring at the local level and not at the state level. That
155 For a description of evidence-based grant-making to counties, see Fact
Sheet, How Counties Approach Evidence-Based Policymaking, PEW-MACARTHuR,
July 11, 2018, at https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-
sheets/2018/07/how-counties-approach-evidence-based-policymaking [https://
perma.cc/ES94-ZPPHJ.
156 National Association of Counties, Data-Driven Justice: Disrupting the Cycle
of Incarceration, at https://www.naco.org/resources/signature-projects/data-
driven-justice [https://perma.cc/D6CG-M6QJ].
157 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 453 (1998).
158 Id. at 462.
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experience provides a lesson in how local constitutional law
can develop.
The area of custodial interrogations has undergone a real
revolution in the past decade. Many local governments and
some entire states have adopted videotaping of interroga-
tions.1 5 9 They have done so because videotaping has become
fairly inexpensive, but also because of a large body of research
on what cases false confessions, together with examples of ex-
onerations involving false confessions.16 0 That said, constitu-
tional law could have facilitated this change in local practices.
As a matter of constitutional law, courts could have prioritized
accurate evidence from interrogations and encouraged local
police to document and record interrogations to ward off false
confessions. Instead, the practical challenges faced by govern-
ment decision makers and changing research and technology,
and not constitutional law, has informed policy and practice.
Nor was Miranda well suited towards providing guidance to
agencies seeking to improve interrogation practices; the ruling
did not engage with local government practices. Yet, almost in
spite of the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment regulation,
which is highly complex but not informative of best practices,
there has been an enormous amount of experimentation that
actually has improved interrogation practices. Constitutional
law has little influence over interrogation practice and policy-
but it could if it attended to the right local practices.
There are some advantages to preferring localism in consti-
tutional law that does try to reward experimentation. Local
government may have substantial leeway in how it sets its
policy, making local government far more able to experiment
broadly in policy and in law. As Wayne Logan explains, "Al-
though the substance of local laws must comport with state
and federal constitutional expectations, local governments typ-
ically are limited only to the extent that their laws are pre-
empted by or conflict with extant state law."' 6 1 Local
government may be a far more capable and flexible laboratory
for experimentation than state government.
159 For an overview of these efforts, see Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated
Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REv. 395, 416-17 (2015).
160 See iCL
161 Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal
Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
143, 155 (2009).
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D. A Local Empirical Research Agenda
One challenge in many of the areas developed in this Arti-
cle is a lack of data concerning local law and practice. Even on
high-profile topics like the death penalty, scholars (like this
author) had to painstakingly hand-collect county-level data be-
cause it did not already exist. In some areas, including in
criminal law and procedure, there has been an endemic lack of
adequate data to study important questions, including consti-
tutional questions. 1 6 2 Courts may defer, in the name of local-
ism, to local practices without realizing that they are in fact
outlier practices.
Some federal agencies conduct surveys of counties that
can provide valuable information. For example, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture tracks socioeconomic indicators like pov-
erty, unemployment, median household income, and
education, at the county level. 163 The Department of Com-
merce collects county-level economic data on employment,
business patterns, and building permits. 16 4 The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collects county-level
data on a wide range of health issues, including alcohol use,
births, cancer, chronic diseases, deaths and mortality, immu-
nizations, obesity, physical activity, and other data.16 5 In crim-
inal justice, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal
Bureau of Investigations maintains data on county-level ar-
rests and offenses in its Uniform Crime Reporting Program.1 66
County-level data on voting patterns in federal elections is
available and many states make election results available on-
line, with voting district-level results as well.1 6 7 The DOJ Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics conducts census studies of local
criminal justice actors, including public defender offices, pub-
162 See generally, Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 101, 126-33 (2018) (exploring the opportunities and concerns
of more empirical evidence on the criminal justice system).
163 Dep't of Agric., County-level Data Sets, at https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/county-level-data-sets/ [https://perma.cc/KHX3-TAP3].
164 U.S. Census Bureau, Local Economic Data for Counties, at https://www
.census.gov/econ/geo-county.html [https://perma.cc/22QL-VZYB].
165 CDC, County Data, at https://www.cdc.gov/DataStatistics/ [https://per
ma.cc/YHB5-A53J] and https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/data/county.html
[https://perma.cc/6CEX-J2QR].
166 UnIform Crime Reporting Program Data: County-Level Detailed Arrest and
Offense Data, 2012, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/
35019 [https://perma.cc/8ZNL-BX28].
167 U.S. Presidential Elections, at https://libguides.princeton.edu/elections
[https://perma.cc/G4H7-3RZA].
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licly funded crime laboratories, local law enforcement agencies,
and problem-solving courts.1 68
Researchers are receptive to interest by the judiciary. If
courts express interest in taking account of patterns of local
practices, then researchers will do more work to measure and
evaluate those local practices. That has occurred in the death
penalty area, where two generations of academic researchers
have conducted state-level and national studies of death sen-
tencing patterns. There will also be more pressure for localities
to make data and practices public and available to researchers,
if they are relevant to judicial decision making. Research
grants and non-profits interested in funding salient academic
research will similarly provide resources to conduct local gov-
ernment research if it could inform constitutional doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The local matters in constitutional interpretation. I have
described how local governments are commonly actors in con-
stitutional litigation. For that reason, their interests can re-
ceive some deference and they can shape the litigation. When
local government practices inform doctrine, however, it does so
as a type of evidence. I classify and discuss examples of four
types of use of local evidence in constitutional law, in which
courts: (1) examine patterns of local law and practice; (2) ex-
amine best practices at the local level to influence the appropri-
ate constitutional floor; (3) examine county-level enforcement
to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely en-
forced at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to
inform constitutional norm-development. The use of local evi-
dence in constitutional interpretation can be far more evi-
dence-based. Courts can and do attend to patterns in local
decision making, but they often neglect to do so in areas in
which the local could meaningfully inform the analysis. In do-
ing so, there are important methodological limitations and
challenges. In many areas, there is a genuine lack of data
concerning local rules and practices. To set a constitutional
floor without such information could be a mistake. However, if
courts demand data, then there will be pressure to collect it
and the resources and incentives to analyze it. Whether courts
then make good use of data is another question. The death
penalty context provides a case study in how better local-level
168 Bureau of Justice Assistance, All Data Collections, at https://www.bjs
.gov/index.cfm?ty=dca [https://perma.cc/UT8B-98CB].
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data can inform important questions of policy and constitu-
tional rights; whether these data will inform constitutional
analysis remains to be seen. We learn important things about
constitutional rights by disaggregating state and local inter-
ests. Local governments are often the relevant decision makers
and their incentives and structures matter to ensure compli-
ance with constitutional values. However, it is not enough to
preserve the role of local government by relying on local actors
as defense litigants in constitutional cases. We need to know
whether the rules or practices of a litigant are representative
before crediting them. We can obtain a better sense of how
constitutional rights are implemented on the ground by paying
attention to local patterns of enforcement or practice. Nor
should we neglect, however, the role that state-level resources
and law plays in setting practices. There is a great deal of
heterogeneity among local governments, ranging from rural
counties to urban cities. Improved data collection should at-
tend to all of those questions. The local matters in constitu-
tional law, but it does not consistently matter, and local
governments sometimes receive deference without adequate
analysis of local law and practice. Local evidence can be used,
not just to defer to localities, but to reach better results in
constitutional law. Local evidence can be used more accurately
and effectively. Judges, lawyers, and researchers should take
more account of evidence from the local, even when interpret-
ing the U.S. Constitution. In making local constitutional law
more evidence-informed, judges should avoid the selective use
of the local in constitutional law. That alone would be an enor-
mous improvement in the use of local evidence in constitu-
tional interpretation.
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